By Frank Alcock, Ph.D

Dr. Frank Alcock is the director of the Marine Policy Institute, Mote Marine Laboratory and Associate Professor of Political Science at New College of Florida Division of Social Sciences. He is also a Collins Center Fellow and co-author of the 2010 report "Potential Impacts of Oil & Gas Explorations in the Gulf"

Last Thursday I was able to attend a Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Scientific Meeting at Louisiana State University. The meeting was organized by the Consortium for Ocean Leadership and it brought together important components of the scientific community that will be studying the Gulf oil spill for years to come. Meeting participants first listened to briefings on the spill and response from U.S government agency officials (NOAA, USGS/Interior, NSF, Sea Grant) before breaking out into subgroups that discussed the magnitude and extent of the spill, tracking issues, and ecological and socio-economic impacts over the short and long term. The end of the meeting had the leaders of the breakout sessions report back to all conference participants (including agency officials) on knowledge gaps and research needs. A meeting report will be made available to the public in the coming weeks. I found the meeting to be informative on a number of fronts; learning what U.S. government agencies have done to date as well as their plans for the future, gaining insight into the scientific community’s thinking on crucial questions and uncertainties; and developing a network of scientific experts that Mote and Collins can access in the coming months and beyond. There were numerous themes and observations worthy of comment but I’ll limit my blog comments to three: Perhaps the most prevalent theme was the frustration expressed on the part of the scientific community with regard to data access. The sources of frustration were numerous and included everything from access to samples of "virgin” oil from the leaking well (for the purposes of "fingerprinting” field samples and understanding their processes of degradation), to better high resolution imagery of the leak (for the purposes of estimating flow rates), to a central clearinghouse that would help scientists more efficiently locate a broad range of data being collected. In fairness to government and industry, the National Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations place legal constraints on access to the data being collected in conjunction with the spill. Nevertheless, agency officials appeared to understand the need for greater transparency and they seemed receptive to making more data accessible and easy to find. A second observation concerned efforts to estimate the flow rate and to verify reported plumes of oil lurking at various depths in the water column. These are separate but linked issues. My sense of the recently reported government estimate of 12,000 to 19,000 barrels a day of leaking oil is that it likely understates the actual rate. Moreover, the reluctance on the part of BP and government officials to acknowledge the existence and potential threat of massive underwater plumes is misplaced. I suspect that they are very real and potentially hazardous. These sentiments are based upon both plenary and breakout session discussions that I was privy to and require further explanation which I will provide in a separate post. Finally, I was somewhat dismayed by both the lack of representation on the part of social scientists/economists and the lack of forethought regarding how to accurately measure socio-economic impacts in a rigorous way. The significance of socio-economic impacts was well understood by all conference participants and the importance of scientifically assessing them was rhetorically acknowledged. But the mobilization of scientific resources and careful planning with respect to measuring the ecological impacts of the spill had no parallel on the socio-economic component of this meeting. This too will be the focus of a separate blog post.

Listen to Dr. Alcock's May 24 interview on Voice of America.            

                                            
by Frank Alcock, Ph.D

     Dr. Frank Alcock is the director of the Marine Policy Institute, Mote Marine Laboratory and Associate Professor of Political Science at New College of Florida Division of Social Sciences. He is also a Collins Center Fellow and co-author of the 2010 report "Potential Impacts of Oil & Gas Explorations in the Gulf"

   On Saturday, news reports confirmed that the initial attempt to place a 100-ton concrete dome over the primary leakage point in the riser (Plan B) failed. Ice crystals associated with escaping methane gas apparently clogged the outflow hole and rendered the dome too buoyant to function properly. The dome has been moved off to the side of the leak (on the seabed) while the accident response team ponders its next steps.

     With a successful Plan C (a relief well that can permanently seal the leaking well) remaining months away, we can expect to see a number of variations on Plans A and B in the coming weeks. This will likely involve additional attempts to activate or engage the blowout preventer and, if that fails, another possible attempt to capture the leaking oil under the dome before pumping it to the surface.

     What is especially distressing is the sense we get that the situation at hand is one that was never anticipated by industry or government. One would think that a robust safety regime would include protocols for most if not all conceivable scenarios. While robust emergency response protocols have been operationalized to contain the spill at the surface, efforts to stop or contain the leak from the seabed appear disturbingly ad hoc.

     Forthcoming investigations into this accident will no doubt tell us much about what happened and what measures were taken to prevent it. The failure of the blowout preventer is already receiving scrutiny. An explicit focus should be directed toward a) the reliability record of blowout preventers in inspections and/or reported accidents; b) the accessibility of these records; c) contingency plans for the current scenario (failure of the blowout preventer at a wellhead in deep water).

     Perhaps the most important question to be addressed in the wake of this disaster is whether the current scenario was foreseeable. If not, why not? If so, where is the information that discusses it and what does it say? And what happened to the contingency plan?

by Frank Alcock, Ph.D   Dr. Frank Alcock is the director of the Marine Policy Institute, Mote Marine Laboratory and Associate Professor of Political Science at New College of Florida Division of Social Sciences. He is also a Collins Center Fellow and co-author of the 2010 report "Potential Impacts of Oil & Gas Explorations in the Gulf"

Source: NASA

 April 20, 2010, will no doubt be looked upon as a seminal date in the history of offshore drilling in U.S. waters. Accidents of this magnitude are painful because of the economic and environmental damage they inflict, but the loss of life in this instance is especially tragic.

The spill has yet to be contained. In fact, the latest information indicates that the volume of oil leaking from the well could be significantly larger than first reported. Considerable uncertainty persists regarding both the causes and ultimate consequences of this unfolding drama.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Deepwater Horizon blowout is its timing. Offshore drilling has been a perennial cause célèbre for Floridians. But the past year has witnessed a vigorous debate triggered by a legislative push to remove a ban on exploration and development of oil and gas resources within Florida's state waters. By mid-March of this year it was becoming apparent that the Florida legislature would not lift the state moratorium during the 2010 session. Then, on March 31^st, President Obama announced a plan to open some areas in federal waters in the Eastern Gulf (along with areas along the Atlantic seaboard and north Alaska coastline) and the debate resurfaced with renewed vigor. Although no legislation was forthcoming this session, it was clear that offshore drilling would remain on the legislative docket for next year.

For the past six months the Century Commission for a Sustainable Florida and Collins Center for Public Policy and have worked diligently to serve as a knowledge broker on offshore drilling. Rather than taking sides, these organizations have attempted to constructively highlight what is known about the potential risks and rewards of offshore drilling, what is unknown or uncertain, and what assumptions, claims and/or conclusions are reasonable in light of the information obtained.

The historical record reveals that major oil spills associated with blowouts like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon are rare. This one will likely be the worst blowout spill in U.S. waters since the 1969 Union Oil spill that decimated the Santa Barbara. Calif., coastline. A much more recent blowout, the Montara oil spill in the East Timor Sea, received worldwide attention this past August and cast a shadow over Florida's offshore drilling debate. But before April 20, many drilling proponents argued that a comparable incident would not occur in the Gulf because of U.S. regulatory standards, advanced technology, or a combination of the two. Although the Australian Government has yet to release its final report on the Montara oil spill, that claim can no longer be considered reasonable.

The Collins Center believes more strongly than ever that it should continue to serve as a credible knowledge broker on the topic of offshore drilling. There will no doubt be a thorough assessment of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Premature conclusions should be avoided. Instead, due diligence needs to be exercised in reconsidering the risks associated with offshore drilling and the manner in which they are characterized.